



## Policy Perspective

# United Nations Security Council Resolution 2797: A Political Solution for a New Geopolitical Order

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### ABSTRACT

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2797 is breaking a decades-long deadlock in the conflict over the Moroccan Sahara territory. This article analyzes the extent to which the resolution affects and shapes the behavior of the conflicting parties, their methods of exerting pressure, and their willingness to make concessions. The analysis reveals that Morocco maintains a strategic advantage, as the resolution enshrines its proposed solution and Morocco is the country that developed and drafted the Autonomy Plan to be discussed by the other parties. Conversely, Algeria and the Polisario face diminishing strategic options and increased international pressure. In this context, Resolution 2797 serves as a catalyst for a major geopolitical reconfiguration in the Maghreb, initiating a new geopolitical order with profound implications for Africa and the Atlantic.

### KEYWORDS

Resolution 2797, Security Council, Morocco, Initiative of Autonomy, Geopolitical order

## Introduction

The conflict over the Moroccan Sahara territory has begun in 1975 and has persisted ever since. For nearly five decades, efforts have focused on finding a solution acceptable to the three principal parties with opposing positions: Morocco on one side, and Algeria and the Polisario on the other. However, progress toward a resolution has long been hindered by differing interpretations of the principle of self-determination. Over time, this principle has become increasingly contested and less capable of providing a clear and workable path forward.

In 2007, Morocco proposed the plan of autonomy of Moroccan Sahara as solution to counter the paralysis generated by the prolonged United Nations (UN) led referendum process. The autonomy plan suggests a political solution based on a large autonomy under the Moroccan sovereignty that the UN has to favor in a fast changing geopolitical and international context and to overcome the referendum deadlock.

As the conflict approached its fiftieth year, and eighteen years after the introduction of Morocco's autonomy plan, this proposal has progressively gained recognition as a credible and viable solution.<sup>ii</sup> On October 31, 2025, the UNSC adopted the resolution 2797 that enshrines the autonomy plan as basis to achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable resolution to the dispute, recognizing that genuine autonomy could represent a most feasible outcome.<sup>iii</sup>

To implement the UNSC resolution, the United States initiated a negotiation process involving the parties to the conflict: Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, and the Polisario. Given the divergence of their interests, these negotiations are expected to be highly challenging. The relative leverage and capacity for pressure possessed by each actor will play a decisive role. Reaching any agreement will necessitate that one party relinquish certain interests, making prestige and face-saving a central factor in the negotiation dynamics.

Given this diplomatic shift, this article aims to investigate the following question: to what extent does UN Security Council Resolution 2797 redefine regional power dynamics and compel the actors in the conflict to realign their national interests with a new geopolitical reality?

To address the research question, this study adopts a neo-realist analytical framework, primarily grounded in structural realism (Waltz, K. N., 1979). This approach is prioritized because it provides the necessary tools to analyze power relations, state survival, and security dilemmas in the anarchic regional sub-system of the Maghreb (Buzan, B., 2003). The analysis is guided by three core neo-realist pillars: 1- The Principle of Self-Help and State Survival: Examining how each stakeholder (Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania) prioritizes its territorial integrity and national interest as essential for survival. 2- Relative Gains and Hegemony: Analyzing the regional competition not merely as a legal dispute, but as a struggle for regional leadership where economic corridors and infrastructure (e.g., the Atlantic Initiative) serve as tools for power projection. 3- Strategic Rationality: Assessing the "pragmatic activism" of states as they adapt their alliances and postures to shifting global political trends. (El Harchiche, 2023).

This study employs a qualitative research design based on: Process tracing: Analyzing the evolution of UN Security Council resolutions, leading to the pivotal Resolution 2797, to identify shifts in international legitimacy. And, comparative analysis: Systematically evaluating the diplomatic positions and recent official pronouncements of the stakeholders to track strategic reorientations.

The analysis is structured around four thematic axes derived from these analytical criteria:

- Algeria's Dilemma: An analysis of the tension between maintaining a historical doctrine and the escalating risk of diplomatic isolation.
- Mauritania's Pragmatic Shift: Evaluating the move from "constructive neutrality" to increasing strategic integration with Morocco, driven by economic imperatives like the Atlantic corridor.
- The Polisario's Existential Crisis: Examining the impact of dwindling international support and restricted military-political options.
- Morocco's Strategic Consolidation: Analyzing how Morocco transforms diplomatic advantages into a structural lever for the Atlantic and Sahel regions.

## **Algeria: Doctrinal rigidity and the challenges of diplomatic adjustment**

From Algiers' perspective, the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 2797, which recognizes the autonomy plan, constitutes a significant diplomatic setback. It narrows the range of strategic options available to the state, its political and military leadership, and its foreign policy more broadly. The Algerian authorities may interpret this resolution as a challenge to their international standing, placing their regional policy under increased international scrutiny. Such a context could generate heightened tensions and unpredictable reactions. Officially, there is no indication that Algeria is prepared to accept, particularly without reservation, an outcome perceived as favorable to Morocco.

The rigid stance of Alger is understandable because it lacks of diplomatic and political flexibility that reduce the range of choices and solutions. In a diplomatic impasse marked by the erosion of a fifty-year strategic investment and declining returns on its long-term foreign policy, Algeria's primary objective appears to be the management of domestic political repercussions. While the country displays considerable doctrinal rigidity, adaptation to the autonomy plan would require a comprehensive

realignment of policy. Such a shift entails responding to domestic institutional expectations regarding both the justification and the modalities of this reorientation, while at the same time signaling diplomatic credibility on the international stage. Moreover, it is a difficult position to hold and maintain in a democratic way and the enormous and serious dilemma to Algeria is the management of the Polisario's future. The dilemma facing Algeria stems from the fact that, over time, the Polisario increasingly represents a strategic and financial liability for Algeria, thereby constraining its diplomatic flexibility and the relationship between the two entities is a principal-agent relationship, and thus the Polisario is part of Algeria.<sup>iv</sup> (Masumoto Shoji, 2004). In addition, the question of the Polisario's future and its impact will confront Alger over domestic and foreign policies adaptation. Indeed, the question "the management of the Polisario's future status" or "the strategic challenge of disengagement" will arise acutely.

Opportunities for actions are diminishing for Algeria. In other words, while rejecting the autonomy plan, Algeria is left with little alternative but to maintain a discourse that challenges the international community's compliance with established legal frameworks and alleges a betrayal of the fundamental principles of international law regarding the Sahrawi people. The question then arises as to how Algeria can respond to a binding decision from the Security Council? Algeria's margin of maneuver regarding a Security Council decision remains a critical point of analysis.

We expect that the round-tables will have a difficult start for three reasons. First, Algeria does not offer a trusty regional environment that lacks of symbolic actions such as appeasing discourses and restoring diplomatic communication's channels with Morocco or concrete actions carrying out lasting and durable relations as well. Certainly, the trust is crucial and the obstacle to implement it lies in the Algerian foreign policy that is reluctant and fundamentally opposed to the idea of a new era in the relations between two countries.

Second, to be part of the round-tables is for Algeria the end of a foreign policy based on a pretended neutrality that it is not part of the conflict and the defense of fair stance for the just positions defending the Saharawi peoples' rights.

And third, Algeria will fear to be accountable for the regional fiasco generated by a blocking foreign policy and facing a serious question that is who will pay for all the damages and missed opportunities. The 2797 resolution enshrining the Moroccan solution would be perceived as second humiliation in the history of Algeria since its independence. Indeed, the first perception of humiliation happened when the President Ben Bella accompanied by Boumedienne, Minister of Defense and Vice President of the Government, declared, "They have humiliated us, O brothers, they have humiliated us"<sup>v</sup>, following the Sand War. This sentence had a stigmatizing effect, and remained, and remains in the collective Algerian memory as a shame and an affront that had to be washed away. Furthermore, the perception of humiliation is playing an increasing role in shaping diplomacies and foreign policies (Badie B., 2017). Indeed, the intensification of Algerian internal and regional challenges has resulted in a confrontational foreign policy toward Morocco, characterized by a zero-sum logic where strategic success is perceived as inherently linked to the containment of Moroccan diplomatic initiatives (El Yaaqoubi S., 2024).

In a context of diplomatic impasse marked by the progressive weakening of a long-term strategic commitment, the adoption of Resolution 2797 may be interpreted as a significant constraint on Algeria's foreign policy repertoire. This development is likely to intensify decision-making pressures while narrowing the spectrum of available strategic options. From a neo-realist perspective, the possibility of escalation cannot be entirely excluded. First, when actors perceive a contraction of strategic alternatives, the use of force may emerge as a residual option. Second, patterns of interaction in high-tension environments suggest a propensity toward more assertive postures. Nevertheless, any recourse to military confrontation would entail substantial costs and risks, with potential implications for both regional stability and Algeria's domestic cohesion, thereby highlighting the high-stakes nature of such a trajectory.<sup>vi</sup>

### **Mauritania: Toward strategic integration and economic diversification**

Following the Algiers Agreement in 1979, Mauritania formally recognized the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on August 1979 as the legitimate authority of Sahara territory. Since then, Mauritania has

maintained relationships with Algeria, Polisario and Morocco a foreign policy built on what it has called political neutrality. This foreign policy was set up according to Mauritanian to maintain a balance and promoting peace among all belligerents. (Lacher W., Werenfels, 2025). However, the recognition was a kind of deal that forced Mauritania to accept in order to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity; Mauritania was no match for Algeria and Polisario. (Cherkaoui. N, Tobi, 2021). Mauritania, adhering to its tradition of pragmatic neutrality, may evaluate its position through a cost-benefit lens—carefully weighing what it stands to lose and what it might gain from either maintaining neutrality or adopting a more assertive political stance. Mauritania is currently recalibrating its diplomatic stance, transitioning from its traditional “positive neutrality” toward a more proactive “constructive neutrality”<sup>vii</sup>. This shift reflects Nouakchott’s ambition to move beyond passive observation to act as a pivotal mediator and economic partner within the Maghreb—a strategic evolution that reinforces its geopolitical standing while simultaneously aligning more closely with Moroccan interests (Ammari F., Lyammouri R., 2025). On the one hand, by increasing and developing its ties with Morocco in all domain. The military and strategic partnership that aims to ensure regional peace and prosperity, stability in North Africa, the Sahel border control, and the fight against terrorism and regional threats, has strengthened since 2020 during Guerguerat incident. (Fakir Intissar, A, 2026). Significantly, however, since 2024 in the time of French withdrawal from the Sahel and the end of Operation Barkhane, leaving a G5 Sahel without any real effectiveness.

In addition, Mauritania distanced itself from Algeria and Polisario. Mauritania moved toward a more assertive regional posture well before the adoption of Resolution 2797. Since January 2021, the Mauritanian army placed the outpost Lebrika, located in the region of Tiris Zemmour in the northeast of the country, under its control and made it a sensitive military zone effectively closing the borders with Algeria. This zone became a military territory off-limits to Polisario elements, and it became the first time that Mauritanian army clashed with Polisario troops. Officially, the Mauritanian government spoke of countering the threats of armed groups instead of traffickers<sup>viii</sup>.

Economically, it is a kind of race against wasted time and Mauritania understood and grasped the potential of a sustainable economic relationship with Morocco;<sup>ix</sup> starting with taking advantage of the infrastructures, that Morocco is putting in place. The Guerguerat border crossing that is an essential flow point between Mauritania, Morocco and from there to West Africa, is experiencing an intensification of trade exchanges since the easing of commercial procedures. Another example of the increase of terrestrial connections is the road linking the towns of Es-Smara in Morocco and Bir Moghreïn in Mauritania<sup>x</sup>. Not to mention in near future the completion of two large-scale projects that are Dakhla Atlantique Port, electricity interconnection agreement and the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline. These projects are turning Mauritania geographical position into a geopolitical center that will give it a diplomatic weight. Indeed, this diplomatic gain opens the door for a new Mauritanian role not only for the whole region -Sahel and West Africa- in the field of trade and logistics but in North-South relations as a global energy player as well.<sup>xi</sup> Finally, the revision of the 1986 trade agreement, which began in 2025, is a sign of rebuilding trade relations on solid foundations.

On the other hand, due to its geopolitical location, Mauritania is a crucial partner to Morocco regarding its Sahel’s stability policy. Mauritania knows that is an essential and indispensable link between Morocco and Sahel, between North and South. It is not only a transit point to East, West or Center Africa but also the real hub that binds the whole region, a kind of what was Chinguetti as a spiritual capital. The 2797 resolution is a turning point in the Mauritanian foreign policy because it gives Mauritania a solid basis to move away from the policy of political neutrality adopted since 1979 and to withdraw its SADR recognition. It should be noted that the Polisario has no diplomatic or consular representation in Mauritania.

Overall, in this strategic context, some states unite not merely against power, but against a perceived threat. This framework elucidates why Mauritania is shifting toward Morocco: it now perceives the instability associated with the Polisario and the diplomatic isolation of Algeria as more significant threats than Moroccan hegemony. Consequently, Mauritania’s strategic realignment illustrates Stephen M. Walt’s ‘balance of threat’ theory, wherein regional actors adjust their alliances based on the evolving perception of security threats and strategic guarantees rather than simple power distribution. (Walt, S. M, 1987).

## **POLISARIO: Survival through realism**

As for Polisario, time is no longer on his side and his position is very precarious since Algeria is under international pressure and on the verge as internationally perceived as a regional proxy following a model of asymmetrical influence. It is very likely that Algeria will abandon Polisario to his faith or maintain him under his control and freezing his political and military actions. In this case, Polisario has to deal with existential choices. Polisario can distance itself from Algeria as a rational actor; however, if it reacts otherwise and ties its fate to Algeria, its survival and evolution as a potential political party will be difficult and it could enter a process of dilution.

Polisario has a seize advantage that allows him to survive in some way, in other words, it has the opportunity to show that it is not under Algeria's umbrella or an Algiers's proxy. In an opportunistic approach, the Polisario can take advantage of international attention to break free from Algerian tutelage and demonstrates the willingness to start the process to return to Morocco by agreeing to begin unconditional and direct negotiations. Nevertheless, the Polisario would use negotiations not as leverage, but as an honorable exit that can reassure it about its future as a social and political actor within a democratic system. This solution is a kind of mutually beneficial resolution; however, not automatic, as Morocco has never commented on the possibility of granting this privilege. Potentially, Algeria may no longer obstruct a peaceful reintegration of the Polisario into the Moroccan framework, as the movement increasingly appears to be a strategic liability rather than an asset. Should Algiers perceive the Polisario cause as a strategic dead-end, it might refrain from opposing a peaceful settlement. Furthermore, any attempt at coercion or repression would likely precipitate a major humanitarian crisis, resulting in a significant erosion of Algeria's international diplomatic standing.

In a no way back context, the Polisario, as a rational actor, fighting for his survival since the option of open war with Morocco is a dead end, it will engage in a power struggle with Algeria to acquire as much autonomy as possible. Indeed, the scope of political and strategic action has been considerably reduced. Even on an operational level, Polisario's ground movements are limited and since the Guerguerat's episode are almost nonexistent<sup>xii</sup>. The Polisario used to move within a shrinking 200 km radius between Mahbes and Tifariti, but this ability stopped since this area is under the surveillance and control of the Moroccan military.

However, so far, nothing indicates or shows that Polisario is behaving as a rational actor and it's still acting by ignoring the 2797 resolution and maintaining its will to impose the referendum as a solution to the conflict<sup>xiii</sup>. On January 26, 2026, an official and direct response reflects the alignment of U.S. diplomatic efforts with the framework of Resolution 2797 on both the Polisario and Algeria to accept the arrangements of the resolution unconditionally and without further operational delays; the Ambassador Tammy Bruce, Deputy Representative, at Security council said On Western Sahara, the U.S.-penned resolution adopted in October resulted in the Council voicing strong support for negotiations to reach a mutually acceptable resolution based on Morocco's credible and realistic Autonomy Proposal.<sup>xiv</sup>

## **Morocco: Strategic gains and hegemonic consolidation**

The UNSC's decision is an opportunity for Algeria and Polisarios' Allies to free themselves from the anti-Moroccan policy. However, we should not expect from African Union to align and endorse immediately the decision of UNSC in a way that shows neither compromise nor interpretations with all the consequences that will follow regarding the status of the Polisario in this regional body.<sup>xv</sup>

Resolution 2797 appears to reinforce the preference for a political solution to the conflict. At the same time, it may be interpreted by some observers as marking a shift in the diplomatic dynamics that have structured the dispute for several decades. In this context, Morocco could be seen as benefiting from a more favorable diplomatic environment, although the final outcome of the process remains contingent on negotiations among the relevant actors. Furthermore, the temporal dimension may provide Morocco with additional leverage in shaping the trajectory of future discussions and anticipating subsequent developments. According to Mohammed VI, as expressed in the 2025 Throne Speech, the current approach is presented as an extension of the 2007 autonomy proposal rather than a fundamental politico-legal transformation affecting constitutional or institutional structures.

Such positioning may contribute to a perception of relative diplomatic stability in light of ongoing geopolitical changes.

However, it is important to note that Moroccan's foreign policy toward Algeria can be described as a set of two guiding lines. First, the policy of outreach that the King Mohammed VI reiterated in his speeches despite of the severance of diplomatic relations decided by Algeria in 2021. This policy which uses words as "The Algerian people are a brotherly people", "frank and responsible dialogue", "neither victor nor vanquished", "to preserve the dignity of all parties", "our relations with the brotherly Algerian people", seeks to demonstrate the good faith and the will to not to harm a brother country with whom Morocco "shares deep human and historical ties, a language, a religion, a geography and a common destiny". At the same time, it is a guarantee that Morocco does not advocate a policy of escalation. Therefore, the negotiations process needs a face-saving exit. (Erving Goffman, 1982). Indeed, it enables the performance of sovereign equality on the back of status equality; and serves as a micro-foundation for conflict avoidance in interactions among diplomats and statesmen. (Deepak Nair, 2019). Undoubtedly, states are performing in stage in constant dynamic to manage impression and face that are vital to their reputation, pride, credibility and status. Frank (SCHIMMELFENNIG, 2002). Drawing on Erving Goffman's sociology, we understand that Algeria's impasse stems not solely from a neo-realist power calculation, but from an imperative to save face. For Algiers, Resolution 2797 imposes a complex face-work: how to accept Morocco's territorial reality without invalidating fifty years of diplomatic rhetoric?

After fifty years of dispute, a face-saving protocol is welcomed and Morocco expressed his will that there is a room to such diplomatic satisfaction. However, face-saving is a serious hidden desire for Morocco's belligerents, especially leaders, who will accept the option because it represents to them a fair and last resort solution, and that guaranties them from popular accountability trial as well.<sup>xvi</sup> In fact, Algeria has long claimed that the position it defends is a fair stance for the just positions defending the Saharawi peoples' rights and international law principles meanwhile claiming its absolute neutrality with regard to the conflict. For Algiers, endorsing the Moroccan autonomy plan transcends a mere strategic defeat; it represents a 'breach of the ritual order.' Over decades, support for the Polisario has been woven into the very fabric of Algeria's diplomatic identity. Within a Goffmanian framework, a retreat without a substantial symbolic trade-off would be tantamount to 'social death' on the international stage, stripping the state of its historical prestige and ideological consistency. Certainly, in this case, face-saving will ease the accumulated tensions and the progress of the negotiations.

Second, an offensive diplomacy that is proactive and pragmatic one when it comes to the Sahara issue. In fact, this diplomacy maintained and consolidated the support of the major powers in favor of its autonomy plan; and sustained pressure within the UN for the adoption of the resolution 2797 as well. On a competition level, it is aggressive and it is on the lookout for Algerian diplomatic errors; thus, it is currently eroding Algiers' international credibility whatever in Africa or in international organizations. This diplomacy shows a diplomatic firmness neutralizing the diplomatic architecture that Algeria meticulously constructed over the past five decades and looks like a fragile diplomatic framework. Accordingly, Moroccan diplomacy avoids inconsistent positioning or vacillation; rather, it is characterized by continuity and strategic regularity.

With regard to the Polisario and in order to limit its negotiating power, Morocco could use, in the extreme case, either the technique of attrition in the negotiations; or the threat of the terrorist list or even both at the same time. In both cases and in terms of time, Morocco can afford the luxury of controlling the negotiations and their pace because the pressure is not as strong as that on the Polisario and Algeria.

Morocco has integrated the Sahara territory into a regional economic and strategic framework aimed at sustainable development and lasting peace for a vast territory stretching from the Atlantic to the Niger. Consequently, the intensity and international scope of negotiations will be mitigated by the Sahara's role as a solution and linchpin for this large region. Hence, during the negotiations, Morocco can pressure the Polisario to seek just for a "honorable place" within the Moroccan political system and to join an already underway process.

## Conclusion

Resolution 2797 revealed ambiguities inherent not only in the primary actors involved in the conflict but also in those who have adopted ambivalent or dual stances. It constrained all actors, principally Algeria and Polisario, under a strict agenda lead by US, to avoid diplomatic inertia and to implement the UN resolution.

In this context, and at first glance, it is obvious that Algeria and Polisario are experiencing a reduction in strategic influence and rapidly moving away from a positive outcome if they don't change their strategy whether with regard to their reciprocal relations or with regard to the question of the requirements of the resolution or the post-resolution phase. On the other hand, Morocco has achieved what it has always sought to accomplish, namely the Sahara as a territory legitimately belonging to it, the weakening of Algeria on the diplomatic-strategic stage and a new geopolitical reconfiguration in its favor. Mauritania is the actor that stands to benefit most from Resolution 2797 without having made a sustained and significant efforts, as it has always advocated a policy of neutrality. The resolution provides Mauritania with a solid legal basis to free itself from the pressure exerted by Algeria and Polisario. But it has everything to gain with Morocco since it is introducing major changes in Atlantic and West Africa: Morocco's Atlantic Initiative and African economic corridors; all in a security and economy interdependence vision.

The regional dynamics triggered by Resolution 2797 illustrate a Regional Security Complex, where the security perceptions of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania are so deeply interlinked; according to this logic, one state's strategic gain fundamentally reconfigures the security landscape for the others, creating a new regional equilibrium.

While Resolution 2797 outlines a political solution, the capacity of regional institutions and local actors to absorb this new reality without descending into unforeseen security instability remains the major challenge of the next decade.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

## Notes on contributor

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- <sup>ii</sup> Moroccan initiative for negotiating an autonomy statute for the Sahara region, <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/search?p=S%2F2007%2F206>
- <sup>ii</sup> Secretary Rubio's Meeting with Moroccan Foreign Minister Bourita. Office of the Spokesperson, April 8, 2025 <https://www.state.gov/secretary-rubios-meeting-with-moroccan-foreign-minister-bourita/>
- <sup>iii</sup> /RES/2797 (2025) United Nations Security Council.
- <sup>iv</sup> El Watan of October 8, 2020, revealed that Algeria has spent \$375 billion since 1975 as financial and communication support of Polisario against Morocco. In an interview with the public channel ENTV on July 2025, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune acknowledged, "We have wasted fortunes, billions of dollars spent on Polisario."
- <sup>v</sup> October 1963
- <sup>vi</sup> The two Moroccan jet skiers killed by Algerian coastguards in 2023; also, the violation by the Algerian army of the historical and legal rights of farmers from El Arja (Figuig) to exploit their land in 2021.
- <sup>vii</sup> The Mauritanian government spokesperson, El Houssein Ould Medou, emphasized his country's commitment to constructive neutrality and support for diplomatic efforts to bridge the gap between the parties involved. "Mauritania encourages serious and constructive dialogue to reach a mutually acceptable political solution, in accordance with relevant international resolutions." 27-02-2026 [https://www.cridem.org/imprimable.php?article=791356#:~:text=Mauritanie%20:%20Sahara%20:%20la%20Mauritanie%20r%C3%A9affirme%20sa%20neutralit%C3%A9%20constructive&text=Yabiladi%20%2D%2D%20Lors%20d'un,sahraouie%20d%C3%A9mocratique%20\(RASD\)%C2%BB](https://www.cridem.org/imprimable.php?article=791356#:~:text=Mauritanie%20:%20Sahara%20:%20la%20Mauritanie%20r%C3%A9affirme%20sa%20neutralit%C3%A9%20constructive&text=Yabiladi%20%2D%2D%20Lors%20d'un,sahraouie%20d%C3%A9mocratique%20(RASD)%C2%BB)
- <sup>viii</sup> The North Africa Post, March 11, 2021. *Mauritania to boost army readiness against Polisario incursions*. <https://northafricapost.com/48184-mauritania-to-boost-army-readiness-against-polisario-incursions.html> The Arab, 12/06/2025. *Weekly Mauritania tightens noose on Polisario by shutting key border crossing* <https://theArabweekly.com/mauritania-tightens-noose-polisario-shutting-key-border-crossing#:~:text=Mauritania%20has%20recently%20been%20reorganising,The%20Arab%20Weekly%20staff>
- <sup>ix</sup> Recently, Omar Hejira, Morocco's Secretary of State for Foreign Trade, reaffirmed the Kingdom's commitment to boosting Mauritanian exports. By facilitating their access to European and African markets, Morocco aims to support the Mauritanian economy through a 'win-win' approach designed to strengthen continental integration. <https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/maroc-pr%C3%AAt-%C3%A0-soutenir-l%C3%A9conomie-mauritanienne-et-%C3%A0-%C3%A9changer-les-exp%C3%A9riences/3829441#> (04/04/2026)
- <sup>x</sup> Africa News Service, *Un nouvel axe transfrontalier pour relier le Maroc et la Mauritanie*. (4 avril 2026) <https://fr.apanews.net/diplomacy/un-nouvel-axe-transfrontalier-pour-relier-le-maroc-et-la-mauritanie-2/>
- <sup>xi</sup> On the occasion of the visit of Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani to Morocco and his meeting with the king Mohammed VI "During this meeting, the two Heads of State welcomed the

positive development of the Moroccan-Mauritanian partnership in all areas. They also affirmed their commitment to developing strategic projects to strengthen ties between the two neighboring countries and to coordinating their contributions within the framework of the Royal Initiatives in Africa, particularly the African-Atlantic Gas Pipeline and the Initiative to promote access to the Atlantic Ocean for the Sahel States”. Press Release from the Royal Cabinet. Casablanca, December 20, 2024.

<sup>xii</sup> Reports of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, S/2023/729 and following.

<sup>xiii</sup> Visit of the Polisario delegation to Washington between January 22 and 27, 2026

<sup>xiv</sup> Remarks of Ambassador Tammy Bruce Deputy Representative at UN Council, By United States Mission to the United Nations, January 26, 2026.

<sup>xv</sup> Such as South Africa. A difficult position to maintain since the visit of Zuma, former president of South Africa and leader of the MK party, to Rabat (July 2025) has generated controversy and highlighted unease within the ruling ANC party. In addition, the latter's hostile position towards Morocco is not unanimous in South Africa since the political field is divided between a hostile camp and a favorable or non-hostile camp. See Driss Alaoui Belghiti : “La visite de Jacob Zuma au Maroc révèle des recompositions autour du Sahara marocain dans le débat sud-africain “Policy Center, September 3, 2025.

<sup>xvi</sup> King Mohammed VI speech throne 2025 “consensual solution that saves face for all parties, where there will be neither winner nor loser”.